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The Human Rights Brief is proud to publish the following speech given by Professor Peter Cicchino at the 1998 Robert Cover Conference for
Public Interest Law. As Professor Cicchino described: “People come to the conference from all over the country, united by two common attributes: (1) all
those attending are interested in or currently practicing law in the public interest, which usually means free legal services to poor people, prisoners,
victims of discrimination, and other politically unpopular groups of people; and (2) all those attending share a willingness to spend a weekend bunk-
ing with several other people in a wooden cabin in snowy, rural New Hampshire for the sake of fellowship with people who share their ideals.” 
Shortly after delivering this speech, Professor Cicchino was diagnosed with advanced colon cancer. After battling valiantly for two years, all the
while contributing enormously to the Washington College of Law community and beyond, Professor Cicchino died in July 2000. We celebrate his powerful
vision of human rights and his commitment to the idea that by helping others, we help ourselves. He is sorely missed, but not forgotten.
The Editors.
Since we are in New Hampshire, it seems especially appro-priate that I begin with my favorite story of one of NewHampshire’s most loved sons: Theodore Geisel, otherwise
known as Dr. Seuss. The story is called Horton Hears A Who. The
story is about an elephant named Horton who, because of his
extraordinarily large ears, becomes aware that a community of
microscopic people called Whos live on a dust speck that sits
atop the blossom of a single flower.
Horton’s enhanced auditory ability is, of course, a metaphor
for a heightened moral sensitivity. Once Horton is aware that peo-
ple live on the dust speck, he acts accordingly, doing everything
within his power to protect them.
The other animals in the jungle are not able to hear the
voices of the Whos and consequently do not recognize that per-
sons live on the dust speck on the flower. They find Horton’s way
of relating to the dust speck—and insistence that others act sim-
ilarly— offensive and bizarre. They mock Horton. They abuse him.
They think him insane. They take the blossom on which the
dust speck sits and hurl it into a valley of billions of identical blos-
soms, endangering the lives of the Whos and forcing Horton, the
Whos advocate and protector, to endure countless hours of dif-
ficult and tedious work in finding them.
Finally, in the story’s climax, the other animals assault and
imprison Horton, intent on boiling the dust speck on which the
Whos live. But this is a story by Dr. Seuss, and at the last crucial
moment the Whos —whom Horton has been exhorting with the
slogan “If you only make yourselves heard you don’t have to
die!”—manage to organize themselves to speak one unmistakably
audible “We are here! We are here!”
The other animals hear the voice, recognize that Horton was
right all along, and now aware of the personhood of the Whos
change their behavior accordingly.
I start with that children’s story, not to be funny or senti-
mental, but because I think it powerfully conveys, in a simple and
beautiful way, the central idea on which I will reflect: the idea of
human rights. That is to say, the unique, the profound, the
unavoidable moral and political consequences that flow from the
recognition that the other whose presence we share is a person,
a human being.
The legal document I take for my textual inspiration is the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) of
1948. Ratified when memories of the Holocaust and Nurem-
berg were still freshly seared into the world’s memory, the Uni-
versal Declaration celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. The
topic I have chosen in keeping with the theme of this Cover
Conference is Defending Humanity: The Practice of Public Interest Law
and the Idea of Human Rights.
What I have to say will not be an academic discourse in which
a thesis is argued or idea analyzed. There exists a significant
body of progressive literature on international human rights
covenants. I commend that literature to you. That literature
makes cogent arguments for the justiciability of those rights and
their application to some of the issues we care most about: the
right to housing, the right to an adequate education, and the abo-
lition of the death penalty.
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Instead, the rhetorical form I have chosen is one I encountered
as a Jesuit novice.  That form my master of novices called the “fer-
verino.” 
As I understand it, the ferverino is a deliberate preaching to
the choir. In English, the metaphor of preaching to the choir is
invariably pejorative, but I do not see why that is necessarily so.
Even the choir—the true believers, the already converted—some-
times grows tired and discouraged, is sometimes tempted to
despair. The point of the ferverino is to act as a moral call to arms,
to inspire and console, to put into words and thereby make pre-
sent the ideals we cherish and in which we believe. And in that
act of making present, the hope is that we will remember how
much those ideals mean to us and be strengthened in our com-
mitment to them.
I augment my reading of the Universal Declaration with two
other international agreements: the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both proposed in 1966 but
entered into force in 1976.
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The guiding premise of the Universal Declaration is found in
the first paragraph of its preamble: “the recognition of the inher-
ent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the
world.” 
The articles of the Universal Declaration then go on to enu-
merate those rights, including the freedoms with which we are
familiar from the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
but also including rights to health care, education, a just living
wage, and social security, the sorts of economic and social rights
regrettably not secured by the Constitution of the United States.
The Universal Declaration is a beautiful document, even if—
as with so many of law’s best promises—its strength has been more
in preserving aspirations than providing enforceable legal rights.
I want, however, to dwell on three
fundamental implications of the idea
of human rights and their relevance
to the work of public interest lawyers.
First, human rights imply a shared
human nature.
Second, people are not things and
should not be treated as things.
And third, defending the human
rights of others is itself a constituent
part of leading a good and happy
human life.
The Universal Declaration takes as its empirical premise that
all human beings share certain critical attributes and needs.
Without that empirical premise, the Declaration, indeed the
concept of human rights itself, is meaningless. That set of com-
mon attributes and needs I will call shared human nature.
In using the term “human nature,” I realize I am courting con-
troversy. On the political right, “human nature” is a term fraught
with specific teleologies of what constitutes the proper end of
human life. Defenders of market economics, various social Dar-
winist schemes, capital punishment, and all sorts of harsh and
punitive forms of social organization will invoke this thing called
“human nature” to justify the oppression and subordination of
other human beings. 
On the left, sensitivity to cultural diversity, opposition to any-
thing that smacks of essentialism, and an at times excessive form
of social constructionism make the idea of a shared human
nature singularly unwelcome.
Nevertheless, I will insist on using the term in the following
sense: by “human nature” I mean the shared attributes and needs
that all human beings possess regardless of gender, race, creed,
national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or any other acci-
dent of time or place. The Universal Declaration and subse-
quent covenants identify some of those common human physi-
cal needs: food, shelter, medical care; but also psychological
needs for education, relationships, self-determination, and that
quality in human beings that our own legal tradition calls “liberty.”
From the empirical reality of human nature derive two hope-
ful corollaries.
First, oppression always requires work because it meets the resis-
tance of human nature. That seems so obvious, but sometimes
when we are struggling against oppression it may seem that iniq-
uity is effortless, while justice requires impossible exertions of
energy to bring about and sustain.
Don’t believe it.
Wherever human beings are denied the things they need for
flourishing—food, shelter, work, education, liberty, or dignity—
they will act out. That is why oppressive regimes must invest so
much time, energy, money, and resources in the instruments of
collective deception and social coercion: propaganda, the mili-
tary, and the police. In the United States, it is why our continued
neglect of the basic human needs of tens of millions of people
goes hand-in-hand with a massively expanded and still expand-
ing prison system, and an ever more punitive system of criminal
justice.
The recognition of a shared human nature should also give
us hope that we who so frequently define ourselves by and orga-
nize around so called issues of identity—gender, race, sexual ori-
entation—can transcend those differences and both find genuine
connection and build lasting alliances with others who struggle
for justice. The reason for that hope is grounded in the recog-
nition that we can move beyond the things that divide us because
we are united in something more fundamental than and prior to
those status attributes: a common humanity.
That brings me to my second point: people are not things and
should not be treated as things. 
When we recognize someone as a human being, we acknowl-
edge that we must relate to him or her in a certain way. That is
the whole point of the Dr. Seuss story with which I began. It is a
point grasped immediately by every
child to whom I have ever read the
story. That recognition is the basis of
the empathic ability that underlies
the so called “Golden Rule.” It is, or
so I am led to believe by contempo-
rary neurological science, a capacity
that is effectively hard wired into the
human brain by the time an infant is
a few months old.
An ocean of ink has been spilled,
much of it by legal academics, on
the relative usefulness of thinking about our special relation-
ship to other human beings in terms of rights or obligations. That
distinction is irrelevant here. What is relevant is that we hold fast
to and act upon the conviction that simply because an other is a
person, a human being, he or she has legitimate claims to make
on us as individuals and as a society.
Almost everything we do as public interest lawyers can ultimately
be expressed in these terms: demanding that our clients be treated
as the human beings they are, and that our political community
honor the claims our clients’ humanity makes on that community.
People are not things. It seems so absurdly obvious as to be
unworthy of articulation. But remember this: the single most pow-
erful organizing force in the United States and the world today—
Capitalism—asserts precisely the opposite, namely, people are
things and are to be treated as things.
I do not say that as some kind of inflammatory ideological
remark. I am simply making a statement of fact. Capitalism is
premised on the notion that human labor is a commodity; a
thing to be bought and sold like any other commodity on the open
market. In its most abstract and rarefied mathematical expres-
sion—the equations and formulae of theoretical economics—
labor is one more variable in the cost of production, indistin-
guishable from any other variable. If a firm can double its profits
by cutting energy costs in half, then that is what the logic of the
market says a firm must do. If a firm can double its profits by fir-
ing half its workforce and thereby destroying a community, the
market’s imperative is no different.
In actual practice, in the day-to-day operations of markets, the
treatment of people as things is just as evident. Whether in down-
sizing workers, destroying unions, or making decisions about
product safety, the qualitative difference between human beings
and things is either ignored or effaced by a relentless process of
monetarization and commodification. As Robert Kuttner put it
in his 1997 book, Everything [is] For Sale.  That is to say, everything
is a commodity.
The dogma of the reigning market religion—which you have
surely encountered in the speeches of many politicians and that
school of thought called “Law & Economics” —preaches that this
endless process of commodification and profit maximization
will ultimately redound to the common good of humanity. The
metaphor most often employed is a great rising tide that lifts all
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boats. But the sorts of people public interest lawyers serve are
drowning in that tide. 
While macroeconomic realities may seem remote from our
work, we must acknowledge that late twentieth century Capitalism
is the context for all we do. It must be reckoned with. To the extent
that we see ourselves as defending human rights, we have no choice
but to resist Capitalism’s drive to commodify everything. That drive
is aimed at nothing else than eradicating the qualitative moral dif-
ferences between our treatment of people and things.
I now arrive at my third and last point. In our work to protect
the human rights of our clients, we are making a good and
happy human life for ourselves.  
As I grow ever closer to my fortieth birthday, I become ever
more convinced that there is really only one important question
from which all others flow: In what
does a good human life consist and how
do we go about living such a life? That
question was much on the mind of
Socrates. It was the question he so
relentlessly and persistently and infu-
riatingly put to the businessmen,
priests, politicians, generals, rhetori-
cians, and intellectuals of his day.
The Universal Declaration gives a
partial answer to the first part of that
question: freedom, food, family, education, safe and decent work
at a living wage. What may not be so apparent is that in fighting
to secure those things—those human rights—for other human
beings, public interest lawyers are answering Socrates’ question,
for themselves.
Our lives are the only things that are completely ours. The
kind of life we make is the most important work, the single most
significant project we will ever undertake. One of the things that
makes me saddest when I talk to law students and lawyers is the
recurring impression I get that they have lost a sense of their own
agency, i.e., the sense that their lives are theirs to make of what they
will. Because of that loss, people who are among the most gifted
and privileged in the world instead live with a sense of drastically
constricted possibilities of what they can do with their lives.
I understand how frightening it can be. How crushing the bur-
den of debt can seem. Still, I want to cry at the failure of imagi-
nation and loss of promise represented by all those law stu-
dents—and there are thousands of them—who enter law school
dreaming of doing great things in the pursuit of justice, only to
find themselves defending corporations.
I suppose what I am trying to say is that in my own life as I have
struggled with the question of what makes a good and happy
human life, I have become ever more convinced that struggling
to secure the conditions for a decent human life for others is a
large part of the answer.
I know it is not easy. Just as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights marks its 50th anniversary, this year I mark the 10th
anniversary of my departure from the Society of Jesus, a Roman
Catholic religious order probably better known as “the Jesuits.” 
I had known much happiness as a Jesuit. By most reports, I was
very good at being a Jesuit. But while teaching high school
seniors, I became involved in a controversy surrounding one of
my students. The student had been subjected to an official
inquiry, a temporary suspension, and threats of not being grad-
uated with his class for painting and displaying a picture for
which he had received approval from the chairperson of the
school’s art department. Unfortunately, for my student, the pic-
ture caused a controversy in the school community and greatly
upset the school’s president.
The details of the story are too complex and too many to relate
here. Suffice it to say that the student came to me to protest the
way he had been treated and to ask for my help. I was warned by
fellow Jesuits that the consequences of my advocacy might be dire.
They were right.
I took up my student’s cause, protesting to both faculty and
administration about the unfairness of the process to which my
student was subjected. The student emerged without further
harm. The investigative process was ended, no further disciplinary
action was taken, and he graduated with his classmates. But my
advocacy on my student’s behalf had so angered and alienated
my religious superior that my life as a Jesuit came to an end.
I cannot tell you what it was like for me on the June day in 1988
when I left the Jesuits. For six years it had been my whole life. Being
a Jesuit had become integral to my identity. Losing that was not
unlike getting a nasty divorce, losing your job, and being evicted
all on the same day. In one fell swoop I lost my home, my job, my
community, and a large part of my identity.
I had very little money and very little idea of what I would do.
And for what? So that a 17-year-old kid could paint the pictures
he wanted to paint and have his
human rights of due process and free
expression respected. For that, I jeop-
ardized and lost everything that gave
me security.
But I have never regretted it! The
universe was kind to me. I landed on
my feet—in law school of all places—
and became a public interest lawyer.
I tell this story to impress upon
you this point: courage is often the
better part of freedom. If you want to make a happy and good
human life for yourself and help secure such a life for others, you
must be brave. Immersing yourself in the suffering of others can
be heart-breaking. But just the endeavor to relieve human suf-
fering will bring you great, great joy.
Let me end with a truly great orator’s words, words that I think
are applicable to the struggle for human rights and the practice
of being a public interest lawyer. 
The words come from the second century C.E. Roman Mar-
cus Tullius Cicero, and they are drawn from his essay on friend-
ship. Cicero is responding to an argument he associates with the
Epicureans, the argument that we should not befriend others,
much less the poor and suffering, because they will only add their
troubles to our own. This is what Cicero has to say in response:
What a magnificent philosophy! Why, they take the very sun
from the sky, I should say, when they take friendship from life,
for of all the gifts the gods have given us, this is our best source
of goodness and happiness. What, after all, is this “freedom from
care” they talk about? In appearance it is seductive indeed, but
in actual fact it is something that in many circumstances deserves
only contempt. For it is not in accord with sound principle to
refuse to undertake any honorable proposal or course of action
or, having once undertaken any such thing, to refuse to go
through with it, for fear that one may lose one’s peace of mind.
If we run away from trouble, we shall have to run away from virtue
too, for it is impossible for virtue to avoid trouble in some degree
when she shows her contempt and enmity toward things incom-
patible with herself. When kindness stands out against malice,
when self-control stands against wantonness, bravery against cow-
ardice . . . . And so, if pain does touch the heart of the wise per-
son—and certainly it does, unless we are of the opinion that
every vestige of human feeling has been rooted out of him or
her—what earthly reason could be offered for excising friendship,
root and branch, from life, for fear that it may become the cause
of some slight hardship on our part? For if we remove all feeling
from the heart, what difference is there not, I hasten to say,
between a human being and an animal, but between a human
being and a rock or a stump or anything else of that kind?
Be human beings. Go out and befriend the poor and the
oppressed wherever you may find them. Identify those who
impoverish and oppress them. And then make some trouble! 
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